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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of providing informal care to elderly parents on 
caregivers’ subjective well-being using unique data from the “Preference Parameters 
Study” of Osaka University, a nationally representative survey conducted in Japan. The 
estimation results indicate heterogeneous effects: while informal elderly care does not 
have a significant impact on the happiness level of married caregivers regardless of 
whether they take care of their own parents or parents-in law and whether or not they 
reside with them, it has a negative and significant impact on the happiness level of 
unmarried caregivers who take care of their parents outside their home. These findings 
shed light on the important role that formal care services could play in reducing the burden 
on caregivers, particularly unmarried caregivers who presumably receive less support 
from family members.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The importance of informal elderly care has increasingly become recognized as 
population aging has rapidly progressed in recent decades. While informal elderly care is 
sometimes perceived as a cost-saving arrangement as it helps reduce the need for formal 
care, it is important to take into account the impact of caregiving on caregivers’ life when 
assessing the costs and benefits of informal elderly care. Ignoring such effects might lead 
to an underestimation of the cost of relying on family members to provide care to the 
elderly. 
 
There is indeed a growing literature that examines the impact of informal elderly care on 
caregivers’ employment, physical and mental health, and social and marital life.2 While 
subjective well-being, such as life satisfaction and happiness, has often been suggested 
as an important indicator to assess people’s well-being in recent years (e.g., Layard, 2005; 
Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009), existing work on the effect of informal elderly care on 
caregivers’ subjective well-being remains relatively limited.3 Moreover, the literature 
provides inconclusive results and suggests heterogeneous effects depending, for example, 
on the gender of the caregiver, the relationship between the caregiver and the care 
recipient, and whether the caregiver lives with the care recipient (e.g., Hansen, Slagsvold 
and Ingebretsen, 2013; Van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2007).  
 
This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature and to contribute to broadening our 
understanding of the impact of informal elderly care on caregivers’ subjective well-being. 
The paper focuses its analysis on the experience of Japan for two reasons. First, in the 
case of Japan, while there have been a number of empirical studies that look at the effect 
of informal elderly care on, among others, caregivers’ mental health and psychological 
well-being (e.g., Kumamoto, Arai and Zarit, 2006; Oshio 2014, 2015; Sugihara et al. 
2004) and labor force participation (e.g., Kan and Kajitani, 2014; Sakai and Sato, 2007; 
Shimizutani, Suzuki and Noguchi, 2008; Sugawara and Nakamura, 2014), there has not 
been any previous work that analyzes the effect of providing elderly care on caregivers’ 
happiness, to the best of the author’s knowledge. It would be interesting to see whether 
or not previous findings obtained for other advanced economies hold in the case of Japan 
                                                   
2 See Bauer and Spousa-Poza (2015) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on the impact of informal 
caregiving on caregivers’ employment, health and family life. 
3 As commonly done in happiness studies, the three terms─subjective well-being, happiness, and life 
satisfaction─are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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where filial obligation remains relatively strong and caring for elderly parents has 
therefore traditionally taken place within the family setting. 
 
Second, while Japan’s long-term care insurance (LTCI) system introduced in 2000 does 
not provide cash allowances for informal care, it covers the cost of services availed from 
the formal sector. As a result, a large demand for formal care services has been generated 
and new markets for various services, such as home care, day care, and short-stay care 
services, have emerged with the introduction of the LTCI system (Sugawara and 
Nakamura, 2014). This differentiates Japan from most other developed countries where 
permanent institutional care tends to be the major formal care option and/or market 
volumes are relatively limited even if markets for home care services exist (Sugawara and 
Nakamura, 2014). It would thus be interesting to examine whether the use of such formal 
care services can help mitigate or alleviate the adverse effect of informal elderly care on 
caregivers’ subjective well-being by looking at the case of Japan. This is a valid question 
given that the negative effect of providing care to the elderly on caregivers’ subjective 
well-being may increase the risk of the institutionalization of care recipients, which would 
have an important cost implication for the government. 
 
The key hypotheses that this paper will test using data on Japan are as follows: (i) 
providing care to the elderly negatively affects caregivers’ happiness; and (ii) the extent 
to which informal elderly care affects caregivers’ happiness depends on, among others, 
the marital status of caregivers, the caregiver-care recipient relationship, and caregiving 
conditions. The latter includes living arrangements and the use of formal care services. 
The results of such an analysis will provide a useful dimension that policymakers should 
take into account as part of the assessment of the cost of informal elderly care. The 
findings will also shed light on what measures would be effective in sustaining the 
provision of informal elderly care without incurring an excessive burden on caregivers.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of elderly 
care in Japan. Section 3 reviews the literature on the impact of informal elderly care on 
caregivers’ subjective well-being. Section 4 discusses the econometric methodology, the 
data, and the empirical variables used for the estimation. Estimation results are presented 
in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the key findings and discusses some policy 
implications. 
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2. Background  
 
Japan has experienced an unprecedented speed of population aging over the past few 
decades. The share of population aged 65 and above in Japan (9.9%) was the lowest 
among the then member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) until as recently as 1984, but it had become the highest (20.2%) 
by 2005.4 This share was estimated to be 26.8% in 2015 and is expected to reach 30% 
by 2024 (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2012). 
Improvements in longevity as well as a significant decline in the fertility rate over the 
years contributed to this rapid population aging in Japan.   
 
Figure 1. Changes in Family Structure among Those Aged 65 and Above 
 
Source: An Overview of Comprehensive Survey of the Living Conditions of People on Health and Welfare 
(Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/list/20-21kekka.html, accessed on 
September 18, 2015). 
 
Japan has also observed significant changes in family structure over the past few decades. 
Among those aged 65 and above, the share of those living alone or only with their spouse 
increased from 28.1% to 55.4% between 1980 and 2014 (see Figure 1). In contrast, the 
share of those who live with their children (married and unmarried) decreased by more 
than 40% from 69.0% to 40.6% during the same period. Nakamura and Sugawara (2014), 
                                                   
4 OECD data (https://data.oecd.org/pop/elderly-population.htm, accessed on September 24, 2015). 
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however, point out that the rate of parent-child co-residence among elderly people who 
have children has not changed significantly. Rather, the observed decline in the parent-
child co-residence rate is due mainly to an increase in the number of the elderly who do 
not have any children. For instance, among elderly person households, the share of 
childless households (both childless couples and childless singles) rose from 7.9% in 
2001 to 15.7% in 2010.5 Together with rapid population aging as well as other social and 
economic changes (e.g., increased women’s educational attainment and labor force 
participation), such changes in family structure are likely to reduce the availability of 
informal caregivers and impose a greater burden on a smaller number of caregivers per 
elderly person, posing significant challenges to Japan where elderly care has traditionally 
taken place within the family setting. 
 
Another interesting observation we can make from Figure 1 is that there has been a 
significant rise in the share of those aged 65 and above who live with their unmarried 
children (i.e., single, divorced, or widowed children) from 16.5% in 1980 to 26.8% in 
2014. This trend contrasts strikingly with the declining trend in the share of the elderly 
living with their married children during the same period. Identifying the causes of these 
contrasting trends of parent-child co-residence between married and unmarried children 
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, given this notable change in family structure 
in recent decades, we will take into account the marital status of caregivers when 
analyzing the impact of caregiving on caregivers’ subjective well-being in the present 
study.  
 
In response to rapid population aging and changes in family structure, Japan introduced 
a mandatory LTCI program in 2000 to cover the long-term care of the elderly, which had 
previously been provided partly through the health insurance system and partly through 
welfare measures for the elderly. Under the policy objective of the “Socialization of Care,” 
this new program was designed to promote greater independence of the elderly in daily 
life and to reduce the burden of elderly care on family members. It has a number of key 
characteristics. First, everyone aged 40 or above is required to participate in the program 
and to pay insurance premiums.6 Given its universal coverage, everyone aged 65 and 
                                                   
5 Nakamura and Sugawara (2014) argue that the main explanation for this rise in the number of aged 
population without any children in the 2000s is that there was an increase in the number of married 
women who did not bear any children. 
6  Although the Japanese LTCI system has largely followed the example of the German system, it 
incorporates Scandinavian-style community-based management, in which municipalities act as insurers. 
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above as well as those under 65 with aging-related disabilities are entitled to receive 
necessary care services regardless of income level or the availability of family caregivers 
once they are certified as requiring support or long-term care.  
 
Second, eligibility is thus needs-based, and applicants are evaluated through an objective 
procedure and assigned a care level based strictly on physical and mental disability.7 
Although the Japanese LTCI program largely followed the example of the German system, 
it does not provide cash allowances to the elderly to support informal caregivers, unlike 
the German system. It instead covers only the cost of services purchased from the formal 
sector. Based on a personal care plan provided by a professional care manager, care 
recipients can choose what services to receive and from which provider to receive them 
subject to a 10% co-payment. Service providers are predominantly private, whether for 
profit or non-profit (Campbell, Ikegami and Gibson, 2010). The existence of such service 
markets differentiates Japan from many other developed countries in which permanent 
institutional care comprises the only major formal care sector or market volumes are 
limited even if formal markets exist for home care or day care services (Sugawara and 
Nakamura, 2014). 
 
Since the launch of the LTCI system, the number of persons certified for long-term care 
increased by about 128% from 2.56 million in March 2001 to 5.84 million in March 
2014.8 Among those aged 65 and above, the share of those certified in the total number 
of persons insured increased from about 11.0% to 17.8% during this period. The monthly 
average number of long-term care service users grew even faster by about 162% from 
1.84 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 to 4.82 million in FY2013. Note that the majority 
(about 74.1% in FY2013 up from about 67.2% in FY2000) are users of home-based 
services while the shares of community-based service and facility service users are about 
7.3% and 18.5%, respectively.9  
                                                   
Based on the national government’s guidelines, each municipality administers LTCI and sets insurance 
premiums for its residents (Tsutsui and Muramatsu, 2005, 2007). 
7 The computer aided standardized needs-assessment system categorizes people into seven levels of needs. 
The Care Needs Certification Board, a local committee consisting of health, medical, and welfare experts, 
then reviews this initial assessment and determines whether it is appropriate (Tsutsui and Muramatsu, 
2005). There are currently two levels for those who require support only (Support Levels 1 and 2) and 
five levels for those who require long-term care (Care Levels 1-5). This support/care level determines 
the amount of benefits for which each person is eligible. 
8 The data in this paragraph come from the “Status Report on the Long-Term Care Insurance Projects 
(Kaigo Hoken Jigyou Jyokyo Houkoku) (Fiscal Year 2013)”, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
(http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/kaigo/toukei/joukyou.html, accessed on September 30, 2015).   
9 Those who availed themselves of different types of services are double counted here. 
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In response to the popularity and wide acceptance of the LTCI system in Japan, there have 
been a number of empirical studies that examine the impact of the introduction of the 
LTCI system on the provision of informal elderly care in the country. Although the 
universal coverage of the LTCI system has replaced previous stigmatized means-tested 
long-term care services (Tsutsui and Muramatsu, 2005), some studies find that informal 
care by adult children continues to be the most common source of caregiving for elderly 
parents in Japan (Hanaoka and Norton, 2008; Long, Campbell and Nishimura, 2009). 
Hanaoka and Norton (2008), for instance, find that the presence of adult children acts as 
a substitute for formal long-term care and that such an effect is found to be strongest for 
uneducated unmarried daughters. Their results also suggest that the role of daughters-in-
law in providing care to the elderly is becoming less important than that of unmarried 
children in Japan.   
 
Indeed, Tsutsui, Muramatsu and Higashino (2014) find that perceived filial obligation 
norms have generally declined since the launch of the LTCI system in 2000, and the 
decline was greatest among daughters-in-law in comparison with other family members. 
Arai and Ueda (2003) similarly find that the LTCI system has helped change caregivers’ 
attitudes and that more caregivers have come to believe that society must look after the 
elderly since the launch of the LTCI system. Further, Tsutsui, Muramatsu and Higashino 
(2014) show that declines in filial obligation were more prominent in the dimension of 
physical support, which the LTCI covers, than in financial and emotional support 
dimensions. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
Informal elderly care has gained increasing attention from policymakers as well as 
researchers in recent years as population aging has progressed in many parts of the world, 
particularly in advanced economies. While the relative importance of informal elderly 
care provision by family members relative to formal care services varies across countries, 
family members form the backbone of long-term care systems in all OECD countries 
(OECD, 2013). It is estimated that across OECD countries, on average, over 15% of 
people aged 50 and above provided care for a dependent relative or friend in 2010 (OECD, 
2013). 
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It is tempting to encourage informal care arrangements as it saves the direct costs of 
professional care services and/or can postpone costly institutionalization, but these 
savings may be offset by such indirect costs as reduced employment, possible loss in 
human capital, and greater health care expenditures for caregivers (Bauer and Spousa-
Poza, 2015). In such a case, policymakers need to weigh the intended benefits of informal 
care (e.g., reduced public costs and ensured elderly welfare) against other desirable 
outcomes, such as gender equality in work and domestic roles, public health, marital 
stability, and individual and family well-being (Hansen, Slagsvold and Ingebretsen, 2013). 
There have been an increasing number of empirical studies that analyze the impact of 
informal elderly care on caregivers’ life, particularly on their psychological well-being, 
health conditions, and employment. The key findings of these studies include a negative, 
though relatively limited, link between care provision and employment, particularly 
among female co-residing caregivers; and a negative impact of caregiving on 
psychological health, especially among female and spousal caregivers, and on caregivers’ 
physical health outcomes (Bauer and Spousa-Poza, 2015).10 
 
In contrast, while subjective well-being, such as life satisfaction and happiness, has often 
been suggested as an important indicator to assess people’s well-being in recent years 
(e.g., Layard, 2005; Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009), existing work on the effect of 
informal elderly care on caregivers’ subjective well-being remains relatively limited. 
Among the few studies that exist, Van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2007) suggest 
that by analyzing the impact of providing informal care and of income on caregivers’ 
happiness level, it is possible to estimate the necessary income (i.e., compensating 
variation) to maintain the same happiness level of caregivers after they provide an 
additional hour of informal care. Based on data on Dutch informal caregivers, Van den 
Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2007) find that an extra hour of providing informal care is 
worth about 8 or 9 Euros if the care recipient is a family member and about 7 or 9 Euros 
if the care recipient is not a family member. They suggest that the reason for observing a 
greater loss of utility (i.e., happiness) when providing care to a family member than to a 
non-family member may be due to emotional involvement with the care recipient. 
 
Bobinac et al. (2010) also look at the effect of informal caregiving on caregivers’ 
happiness but examine the family effect more explicitly. They argue that informal care is 
                                                   
10 See Bauer and Spousa-Poza (2015) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on the impact of informal 
caregiving on caregivers’ employment, health and family. 
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usually provided by the care recipient’s family or friends because of the social 
relationship between the care recipient and the caregiver, and as a result, both the 
caregiving effect and the family effect are present in the case of informal caregivers. 
While the caregiving effect refers to the welfare effect of providing informal care, the 
family effect refers to the direct impact of the health status of a care recipient on others’ 
well-being (Bobinac et al., 2010). Using data on Dutch informal caregivers, Bobinac et 
al. (2010) show that caregivers’ happiness is positively associated with the care 
recipient’s (positive) health condition and negatively associated with the provision of 
caregiving, confirming the notion of the caregiving and family effects.  
 
Leigh (2010), on the other hand, finds that while there is a significant negative 
relationship between providing elderly care and life satisfaction in a cross-sectional 
specification, the coefficient on the dummy variable for elderly care provision becomes 
much smaller and insignificant with the inclusion of individual fixed effects based on a 
panel dataset from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
survey for the 2001-2007 period. Van den Berg, Fiebig and Hall (2014) also emphasize 
the importance of accounting for individual fixed effects, though they find that providing 
informal care has a negative and significant effect on life satisfaction based on data from 
the first eleven waves (2001-2011) of the HILDA.  
 
Hansen, Slagsvold and Ingebretsen (2013) distinguish among three categories of 
outcomes: cognitive well-being (life satisfaction, partnership satisfaction, and self-
esteem), affective well-being (happiness, positive and negative affect, depression, and 
loneliness), and sense of mastery. Using Norwegian cross-sectional and panel data, they 
find that providing care to elderly parents is not related to these aspects of well-being, 
both in cross-section and longitudinally, with the one exception being that caring for a 
co-resident parent leads to lower affective well-being among women. This effect is 
particularly marked among un-partnered and less educated women (Hansen, Slagsvold 
and Ingebretsen, 2013). Given that their findings of non-significant associations between 
caregiving and well-being measures conflict with the findings from the existing literature 
based largely on data on the United States, Hansen, Slagsvold and Ingebretsen (2013) 
highlight the important role played by a country’s social care systems in shaping the 
impact of caregiving on caregivers’ well-being. They argue that in the case of the Nordic 
care regime, personal care (e.g., help with dressing, bathing, and eating) is mainly 
provided by public (or private) care service providers and the family usually plays only a 
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complementary role, and as a result, informal care provision does not seem to jeopardize 
caregivers’ self-esteem, mental health, or well-being.  
 
This review of the existing literature highlights the inconclusive results with regard to the 
impact of caregiving on caregivers’ subjective well-being. The literature also suggests 
heterogeneous effects depending, for example, on the gender of the caregiver, the 
relationship between the caregiver and the care recipient, and whether the caregiver lives 
with the care recipient. This paper will therefore test the hypotheses outlined in Section 
1, namely: (i) providing care to the elderly negatively affects caregivers’ subjective well-
being, and (ii) the extent to which informal elderly care affects caregivers’ subjective 
well-being depends on, among other things, the marital status of caregivers, the caregiver-
care recipient relationship, and caregiving conditions such as living arrangements and the 
use of formal care services.  
 
4. Methodology and Data 
 
4.1 Methodology 
 
When analyzing the impact of informal elderly care on caregivers’ subjective well-being, 
this paper focuses its analysis only on the case of caregivers who provide informal care 
to their elderly parents. Given that spouses constitute the main source of informal elderly 
care among married couples, it would have been ideal to also examine the case of spouse 
caregivers. Unfortunately, the data used for the empirical analysis contain only 
information on adult children’s provision of parental care. Hence, the impact of 
caregiving on spouses’ subjective well-being will be left for future research. On the other 
hand, given that there has been a significant increase in the number of elderly persons 
living with their unmarried children in Japan over the past few decades (see Figure 1), 
this paper will examine whether there is any difference in the impact of informal elderly 
care between married caregivers and unmarried caregivers by conducting regression 
analyses separately for married and unmarried individuals. We would expect the burden 
of informal elderly care to be greater on unmarried caregivers than on married caregivers, 
especially if they have children, because they do not have a spouse who can help with 
various responsibilities, including breadwinning, caregiving, childrearing, and 
housework. 
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In general terms, the models for unmarried individuals (equation (1)) and married 
individuals (equation (2)) are, respectively, as follows: 
 
Wi = f (Ci, Hp, Xi)            (1) 
Wi = f (Ci, CPi, Hp, HPpp, Xi)           (2) 
 
where Wi is the individual’s subjective well-being, which is assumed to be a function of 
care provision to his/her own parents (Ci), the health status of his/her parents (Hp), and a 
vector of demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the individual and his/her 
household (Xi). Following Bobinac et al. (2010), the family effect on individual 
subjective well-being will be examined separately from the caregiving effect by including 
a variable that captures the health status of parents. Additionally, in the case of married 
people, they may also provide care to their parents-in-law. Thus, married people’s well-
being will also be a function of care provision to their parents-in-law (CPi) and the health 
status of their parents-in-law (HPpp) in addition to the aforementioned factors. Note that 
the subscripts i, p and pp denote the individual, his/her parents, and his/her parents-in-
law, respectively. 
 
When estimating the above models, there are two key methodological issues that need to 
be considered. First, information on people’s self-reported happiness is commonly 
reported as a 0-10 categorical ordered variable, and the data used for this paper are no 
exception. If we want to apply a linear regression analysis to estimate equations (1) and 
(2), we need to assume the cardinality of this variable. Although this is strictly not valid 
in the case of happiness data given its ordinal nature, the assumption of cardinality is 
often made in empirical studies. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), for instance, find 
that assuming the ordinality or cardinality of happiness scores makes little difference to 
the estimates of the determinants of happiness. Similar findings are also obtained by Frey 
and Stutzer (2000). These findings seem to be consistent with the view of Van Praag 
(1991), who shows that respondents tend to translate verbal evaluations to a numerical 
scale when answering subjective questions. Given that the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and ordered logit regressions also generate very similar results in terms of the sign and 
significance level of the estimated coefficients in the present analysis, the cardinality of 
the happiness variable is assumed throughout this paper.11  
                                                   
11 The OLS and ordered logit regressions were estimated separately for married and unmarried individuals 
and the results of the OLS and ordered logit regressions were similar in both cases. See Appendix II for 
the ordered logit regression results. 
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Second, it is not clear a priori whether informal elderly care provision is endogenous in 
a model of subjective well-being. Although this does not seem to be addressed in the 
existing literature that looks at the impact of informal caregiving on caregivers’ subjective 
well-being, it is possible that happier people are more likely to provide informal elderly 
care than less happy people. Ignoring reverse causality such as this would lead to biased 
and inconsistent estimates in the case of OLS estimation. It is therefore necessary to 
empirically test for the endogeneity of informal elderly care, and if it is found to be 
endogenous, we need to control for it. This can be done by estimating instrumental 
variables models, which produce consistent parameter estimates as long as valid 
instruments are available. This is a common approach taken in the related literature, 
including empirical studies examining the effect of informal care on caregivers’ physical 
and mental health (e.g., Coe and Van Houtven, 2009; Do et al., 2013; Van Houtven and 
Norton, 2004, 2008; Van Houtven, Wilson and Clipp, 2005) and those examining whether 
informal elderly care is a substitute or complement for formal care (e.g., Bolin, Lindgren 
and Lundborg, 2008; Bonsang, 2009; Charles and Sevak, 2005).     
 
One complication we need to take into account in the current analysis is the fact that our 
potentially endogenous variable is binary. In such a case, instrumental variables 
estimation using standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation would generate 
inconsistent estimates (e.g., Woodridge, 2002). Following Woodridge (Procedure 18.1 in 
Woodridge (2002, pp. 623-624)), the following three-stage procedure will therefore be 
used instead: (i) estimate a binary response model (in this case a probit model) of 𝑔𝑔 on 
instruments and other control variables, (ii) compute the fitted probabilities 𝑔𝑔�, and (iii) 
estimate equations (1) and (2) by instrumental variables with 2SLS using 𝑔𝑔�  as 
instruments for caregiving. One nice feature of this procedure is that even though some 
regressors are generated in the first stage, the usual 2SLS standard errors and test statistics 
are asymptotically valid. In addition, this procedure has an important robustness property 
whereby it does not require the first-stage binary model to be correctly specified as long 
as instruments are correlated with the probability of the outcome variable (Woodridge, 
2002).12  
 
  
                                                   
12 An application of this procedure can be found, for example, in Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2009). 
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4.2 Data 
 
The empirical analysis will be based on data from the “Preference Parameters Study” of 
Osaka University. This survey was conducted annually in Japan during the 2003-2013 
period by the 21st Century Center of Excellent Program “Behavioral Macrodynamics 
based on Surveys and Experiments” (2003-2008) and the Global Center of Excellence 
Project “Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics” (2008-2013) of Osaka 
University. It was undertaken with the aim of examining whether the assumptions of 
conventional economics that people are rational and maximize utility are valid. The 
sample of individuals aged 20-69 was drawn to be nationally representative using two-
stage stratified random sampling. The sample has a panel component although fresh 
observations were added in 2004, 2006 and 2009 to overcome the problem of attrition. 
 
It would have been ideal to conduct a panel data analysis to take into account individual 
fixed effects, but unfortunately only the 2013 wave contains detailed information on 
caregiving and other key variables.13 The empirical analysis will thus be undertaken 
using only data from the 2013 wave in this paper. However, as discussed below, the 
Preference Parameters Study data contain unique information on, among others, 
individual preference parameters. By exploiting such information, the present analysis 
will take into account, to the extent possible, individual characteristics that are often 
treated as unobservable time-invariant characteristics in similar analyses. After excluding 
observations for which at least one variable included in the econometric analysis is 
missing, the 2013 wave contains 2,845 individuals, consisting of 2,382 married 
individuals and 463 unmarried (i.e., never married, divorced, or widowed) individuals.  
 
In addition to basic information on respondents and their households such as household 
composition, consumption, income, and other socio-economic characteristics, this survey 
contains unique information on respondents including their subjective well-being (e.g., 
happiness, life satisfaction, and other emotional attributes) and their preference 
parameters, such as their degree of time preference, risk aversion, and altruism. In the 
case of the 2013 wave, the data also contain detailed information on respondents’ 
provision of parental care. By exploiting this rich dataset, it is possible to examine the 
impact of informal elderly care on caregivers’ subjective well-being while controlling for 
                                                   
13 Although the 2011 wave also collected information on parental care, the way the key question was asked 
was different between the 2011 and 2013 waves. It is therefore not possible to conduct a panel data 
analysis using these two datasets.  
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a set of factors that are thought to be relevant to people’s happiness in the existing 
literature. 
 
4.3 Empirical Specification 
 
While the goal of the present study is to assess the impact of informal elderly care on 
caregivers’ happiness, we also control for factors that have been found to be the key 
determinants of happiness, and as such, the empirical model is guided by existing work 
on happiness.14 A detailed description of how the variables are constructed is provided 
in the Appendix I.15 
 
4.3.1 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is the level of the respondent’s subjective well-being, measured 
in terms of self-reported happiness. The happiness data were collected in the survey by 
asking respondents how happy they currently feel on a simple visual analogue scale 
ranging from 0 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy). As discussed above, we treat this 
variable as cardinal. 
 
4.3.2 Explanatory variables 
 
Parental care provision 
 
The main variable of interest in this paper is a dummy variable capturing whether 
respondents provide care to their elderly parents. In order to examine whether the 
caregiver-care recipient relationship affects the direction and magnitude of the effect of 
informal elderly care on caregivers’ subjective well-being, two separate variables, one for 
providing care to respondents’ own parents and one for providing care to respondents’ 
parents-in-law, are included in the regression for the married sample. As for the unmarried 
sample, only a dummy variable for taking care of their own parents is included. Note that 
these dummy variables equal one if respondents take care of at least one parent and 
                                                   
14 See Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008) for a comprehensive survey of the 
literature on the determinants of the level of happiness. 
16 Irregular employees include those who are working as a part-time worker, temporary worker, fixed-term 
worker, or dispatched worker from a temporary agency. These irregular jobs tend to be low paid and 
insecure in comparison with regular (i.e., full-time) employment. 
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parent-in-law, respectively. We would expect providing care to the elderly to have a 
negative effect on caregivers’ happiness. However, given that unmarried individuals are 
likely to receive less support from family members and perform more roles than married 
individuals, we would expect a greater negative effect of informal elderly care on 
unmarried caregivers than that on married caregivers.  
 
Instruments for parental care provision 
 
Given that parental care provision could be endogenous, it is necessary to test for its 
exogeneity. To do so, a Wu-Hausman test will be conducted by estimating instrumental 
variables models. The existing literature (e.g., Van Houtven and Norton, 2004, 2008; 
Charles and Sevak, 2005) suggests that the number of siblings is a strong instrument for 
informal parental care. The number of sisters and the number of brothers are thus used as 
instruments for providing care to respondents’ own parents in the present study. Similarly, 
the number of sisters-in-law and the number of brothers-in-law (i.e., the numbers of 
spouses’ sisters and brothers) are used as instruments for providing care to respondents’ 
parents-in-law. We would expect that the numbers of siblings and sibling-in-law to have 
a negative effect on respondents’ provision of parental care. In addition, given that the 
Preference Parameter Study also collected information on respondents’ view toward filial 
obligation, we will use a dummy variable that equals one if respondents completely agree 
with the statement that children should take care of their parents when they require long-
term care as an additional instrument.     
 
Health conditions of parents and parents-in-law 
 
In order to examine family effects on caregivers’ happiness, we will take into account the 
health status of parents and parents-in-law. In the Preference Parameters Study, 
respondents were asked whether their parents and parents-in-law are certified as one of 
the seven Support or Care Levels under the LTCI system (see footnote 7). Given that this 
needs level is assigned based strictly on physical and mental disability, this information 
would be a good proxy for the health status of elderly parents. Using this information, we 
constructed a dummy variable that equals one if at least one parent is classified as one of 
the seven needs levels. A similar variable is also constructed for parents-in-law. We would 
expect a negative relationship between these variables and respondents’ happiness.  
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Caregiving conditions 
 
Caregiving conditions might influence the way caregiving affects caregivers’ happiness. 
To test this, we include two variables that indicate whether respondents live with their 
own parents and parents-in-law, respectively. In addition, we will examine whether the 
use of formal care services helps alleviate the negative effect of caregiving by including 
two variables that capture whether parents and parents-in-law avail themselves of formal 
care services, respectively. We will interact these caregiving conditions with the care 
provision variables. It is not clear a priori whether co-residing with parents or parents-in-
law has a positive or negative effect on respondents’ happiness. Similarly, whether the 
use of formal care services has a positive or negative effect on respondents’ happiness is 
an empirical question. The use of formal care services might have a positive effect on 
respondents’ happiness as it frees them from providing informal elderly care or reduces 
the burden of informal elderly care. On the other hand, it could make respondents’ feel 
guilty about not (fully) taking care of their parents or parents-in-law, thereby reducing 
their happiness. As for the coefficients on the interaction terms, we would expect a 
negative sign on the interaction term between caregiving and co-residence variables and 
a positive sign on the interaction term between caregiving and formal care services usage 
variables because the literature suggests that taking care of co-resident parents tends to 
increase the burden on caregivers while the use of formal care services helps reduce it. 
 
Respondents’ and their households’ basic characteristics 
 
A set of individual characteristics capturing respondents’ age, gender, educational 
attainment, health status as well as whether or not they have any children is included. 
Moreover, variables relating to information at the household level are included in the 
analysis, such as those capturing household size, annual household income, whether the 
household owns a house or an apartment, and whether the household has any loans. We 
also include a variable that indicates what percentage change respondents’ expect in their 
annual household income in that year in comparison with the previous year’s household 
income. We would expect respondents’ happiness to be positively correlated with 
household income and the expected change in future income. 
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Respondents’ employment status and expected receipt of public pensions 
 
Given that the happiness literature has extensively examined the effect of labor market 
status, especially unemployment, on happiness, we control for respondents’ employment 
status in the estimation. In addition to controlling for whether respondents are 
unemployed, we also take into account the security of respondents’ employment by 
including a variable indicating whether respondents have irregular employment as well 
as a variable indicating whether respondents perceive a high risk of becoming 
unemployed within the next two years.16 We would expect both unemployment and job 
insecurity to reduce happiness. Furthermore, a variable that reflects the percentage of their 
living expenses that respondents expect to be covered by public pensions after retirement 
(or the actual percentage in the case of retired respondents) is also included in the 
regression. Greater insecurity about life after retirement is also expected to be negatively 
associated with happiness. 
 
Referencing process 
 
To control for the effect of the referencing process on happiness, we include two related 
variables. In the case of the Preference Parameters Study, respondents are asked whether 
they think other people’s living standard is relatively high or low in comparison with their 
own living standard. We create a dummy variable that equals one if respondents think that 
other people’s living standard is higher than their own, and another dummy variable that 
equals one if respondents think that other people’s living standard is lower than their own. 
These variables in effect capture the relative living standard of respondents.  
 
Preference parameters 
 
Given that utility is defined by preference parameters, it is possible that the level of 
individuals’ happiness would also depend on their preference parameters (Tsutsui, Ohtake 
and Ikeda, 2009). Respondents’ degree of time preference, risk aversion, and altruism are 
therefore controlled for in the estimation. While these factors are usually treated as 
unobservable time-invariant characteristics of individuals, the availability of such data in 
the Preference Parameters Study allows us to control for them in the regression analysis. 
                                                   
16 Irregular employees include those who are working as a part-time worker, temporary worker, fixed-term 
worker, or dispatched worker from a temporary agency. These irregular jobs tend to be low paid and 
insecure in comparison with regular (i.e., full-time) employment. 
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In the case of empirical studies that examine the determinants of happiness using cross-
sectional data, the problem of endogeneity arising from unobserved heterogeneity can be 
an issue. This study is no exception, but we cannot undertake a panel data analysis due to 
the data limitation as explained above. Instead, this problem will be addressed in this 
paper by including variables that reflect respondents’ preference parameters so that some 
of the heterogeneity can be controlled for to the extent possible.   
 
In addition to the above explanatory variables, regional dummies as well as a dummy for 
residing in a major (ordinance-designated) city are included to control for geographical 
variation.  
 
5. Empirical Results  
 
Table 1 provides the key summary statistics for the two samples―married and unmarried 
individuals. To obtain an overview of the characteristics of caregivers, the same statistics 
are provided for caregivers and non-caregivers separately for each sample. Regarding the 
outcome of interest, we find that the happiness level of caregivers tends to be lower than 
that of non-caregivers and that the happiness level of unmarried individuals is generally 
lower than that of married individuals. The lower happiness level of caregivers, on 
average, seems to underscore the possible adverse effect of informal parental care on 
caregivers’ happiness. 
 
Caregivers tend to be older and female, though we observe relatively more male 
caregivers in the unmarried sample. While most married individuals tend to have children 
regardless of whether or not they provide care, unmarried caregivers are significantly less 
likely to have children than unmarried non-caregivers, as expected. Both married and 
unmarried caregivers are less likely to have a regular job than their counterparts. It is a 
matter of concern to observe that unmarried caregivers have the lowest level of household 
income, expect the largest decline in their household income in that year, and have the 
greatest tendency to be unemployed. We also observe that unmarried individuals expect 
to receive less public pensions relative to their living expenses after retirement and are 
more likely to feel relatively poor than married individuals, though the differences are 
relatively small between caregivers and non-caregivers in each sample. These statistics 
suggest that unmarried individuals, particularly unmarried caregivers, tend to be more 
vulnerable to negative income shocks than married individuals. 
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On the other hand, married individuals tend to be more altruistic than unmarried 
individuals while unmarried caregivers tend to have a higher time preference (i.e., place 
more emphasis on their well-being today than in the future) than married individuals or 
unmarried non-caregivers. As expected, we find that caregivers’ parents and parents-in-
law tend to be less healthy and are more likely to use formal care services than non-
caregivers’ parents and parents-in-law. Consistent with Figure 1, unmarried individuals 
are more likely to live with their parents than married individuals, though caregivers are 
more likely to live with their parents than non-caregivers in both samples.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
Married 
Caregiver 
Mean/S.D. 
Married 
Non-caregiver 
Mean/S.D. 
Unmarried 
Caregiver 
Mean/S.D. 
Unmarried 
Non-caregiver 
Mean/S.D. 
Dependent variables         
Happiness 6.57 1.75 6.71 1.67 5.78 2.07 5.97 1.93 
         
Explanatory variables         
Age 55.23 7.86 53.76 11.72 51.95 9.13 46.67 14.97 
Age squared/100 31.11 8.56 30.27 12.61 27.80 9.43 24.02 14.49 
Female 0.68  0.49  0.59  0.56  
Education         
  Secondary school 4.29  7.93  0.00  8.69  
  High school 43.56  48.58  56.76  45.77  
  Junior college 22.70  16.13  21.62  14.55  
  University or above 29.45  27.35  21.62  30.99  
Poor health 0.47  0.45  0.54  0.41  
Child 0.94  0.95  0.30  0.43  
Household size 3.87 1.36 3.61 1.33 2.81 1.27 2.71 1.52 
Log of household income 6.39 0.57 6.32 0.59 5.85 0.66 6.00 0.74 
Expected change in 
household income -0.89 4.68 -0.67 3.89 -1.57 4.27 -0.42 3.95 
Homeownership 0.96  0.89  0.84  0.77  
Has loans 0.48  0.49  0.27  0.35  
Employment         
  Regular job 29.45  40.20  37.84  48.36  
Irregular job 34.97  31.00  24.32  30.99  
Not in labor force 32.52  27.99  21.62  15.96  
Unemployed 3.07  0.81  16.22  4.69  
Likely unemployed 0.09  0.07  0.08  0.12  
Public pensions 56.41 25.96 51.27 25.93 49.32 30.42 40.87 26.49 
Relatively poor 37.42  32.63  48.65  50.00  
Relatively rich 12.88  12.35  13.51  10.56  
Altruistic 0.79  0.76  0.62  0.65  
Low time preference 0.38  0.38  0.24  0.37  
Risk averse  45.47 16.98 47.05 19.12 48.51 18.81 48.11 20.31 
Care provision to parents 0.67  0.00  1.00  0.00  
Care provision to parents-
in-law 0.42  0.00  -  -  
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Variables 
Married 
Caregiver 
Mean/S.D. 
Married 
Non-caregiver 
Mean/S.D. 
Unmarried 
Caregiver 
Mean/S.D. 
Unmarried 
Non-caregiver 
Mean/S.D. 
Poor health of parents 0.47  0.10  0.54  0.06  
Poor health of parents-in-
law 
0.30  0.09  -  -  
Living with parents 0.30  0.10  0.84  0.40  
Living with parents-in-law 0.25  0.08  -  -  
Use of formal care services 
(parents) 0.40  0.07  0.43  0.04  
Use of formal care services 
(parents-in-law) 0.28  0.08  -  -  
         
Instruments for care 
provision 
        
Number of sisters 0.81 0.84 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.95 0.93 0.97 
Number of brothers 0.70 0.70 0.92 0.91 0.54 0.69 0.82 0.82 
Number of sisters-in-law 0.98 0.87 1.01 1.02 -  -  
Number of brothers-in-law 0.81 0.78 0.95 0.96 -  -  
Strong filial obligation 0.10  0.09  0.16  0.09  
         
Regions         
  Hokkaido 1.23  4.82  10.81  3.29  
  Tohoku 8.59  5.95  8.11  5.40  
  Kanto 26.38  29.70  35.14  31.69  
  Koshinetsu 5.52  4.73  8.11  3.99  
  Hokuriku 6.13  3.06  2.70  3.99  
  Tokai 11.04  15.50  8.11  13.38  
  Kinki 17.18  17.31  8.11  15.26  
  Chugoku 6.13  5.00  2.70  7.51  
  Shikoku 4.91  3.24  5.41  3.76  
  Kyushu 12.88  10.68  10.81  11.74  
Major city 0.20  0.23  0.30  0.26  
         
Number of observations 163 2,219 37 426 
S.D. = standard deviation. 
Source: Calculations based on data from the 2013 Preference Parameters Study. 
 
As far as the variables that will be used as instruments are concerned, we find that 
caregivers tend to have fewer siblings and siblings-in-law than non-caregivers, as 
expected. It is interesting to note that the number of brothers and brothers-in-law tends to 
be particularly small for caregivers than for non-caregivers. This seems to indicate 
indirectly that daughters-in-law may still play some role in informal elderly care in Japan, 
even though this tendency might be weakening over time, as suggested by Hanaoka and 
Norton (2008). Although we do not see a significant difference in their view toward filial 
obligation between caregivers and non-caregivers in the case of the married sample, 
caregivers tend to have a stronger sense of filial obligation than non-caregivers in the 
unmarried sample. 
 
21 
 
We now turn to testing the endogeneity of the caregiving variables in the happiness model.  
Following the estimation procedure outlined in Section 4.1, we first estimated the first-
stage binary model to obtain the fitted probabilities for providing elderly care separately 
for the married and unmarried samples.17 We used the number of sisters and the number 
of brothers as instruments for providing care to own parents, and the number of sisters-
in-law and the number of brothers-in-law as instruments for providing care to parents-in-
law. We also used respondents’ view toward filial obligation as an instrument in both 
cases. As expected, we find that the numbers of sisters, brothers, sisters-in-law and 
brothers-in-law are all negatively correlated with the probability of providing elderly care 
and that having a strong senses of filial obligation is positively associated with the 
probability of providing elderly care in all cases. The coefficients on these identifying 
instruments are jointly significant at the 1% level in the probit model of providing care to 
parents as well as in that of providing care to parents-in-law for the married sample, and 
significant at the 5% level in the probit model of providing care to parents for the 
unmarried sample.  
 
We then estimated the first stage of the 2SLS using the fitted probabilities obtained from 
the probit model as instruments. Specification tests show that the instruments are strong 
predictors of each of the caregiving variables (F(2, 2344) = 51.24 for providing care to 
own parents and F(2, 2344) = 141.91 for providing care to parents-in-law in the married 
sample, and F(1, 427) = 66.76 for providing care to own parents in the unmarried sample). 
The identifying instruments are also found to be significant at the 1% level in all cases. 
Note also that we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments using the test 
suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) in all cases as the value of this test statistic for all 
equations exceeds the critical value, indicating that a Wald test at the 5% level can have 
an actual rejection rate of at most 10%. Despite having valid instruments, the Wu-
Hausman test results showed that the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the caregiving 
variables cannot be rejected in all cases. We will therefore treat our caregiving variables 
as exogenous in the happiness model and estimate OLS regressions to examine the impact 
of informal elderly care on caregivers’ happiness.  
 
                                                   
17 Regression results of the instrumental variables models as well as the specification test results are 
available upon request. 
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Table 2. Regression Results 
 Married Sample Unmarried Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Caregiving and family effects             
Poor health of parents -0.170 
[0.105] 
 -0.166 
[0.105] 
 -0.058 
[0.113] 
 -0.521 
[0.307] 
* -0.485 
[0.300] 
 -0.624 
[0.377] 
* 
Care provision to parents -0.111 
[0.164] 
 0.167 
[0.215] 
 0.171 
[0.287] 
 0.278 
[0.357] 
 -0.931 
[0.488] 
* -1.198 
[0.492] 
** 
Living with parents   -0.145 [0.122] 
 -0.156 
[0.122] 
   -0.182 [0.225] 
 -0.193 
[0.225] 
 
Providing care to parents*living with parents   -0.502 [0.307] 
 -0.487 
[0.306] 
   1.530 [0.582] 
 
*** 
1.538 
[0.544] 
 
*** 
Use of formal care services (parents)     -0.228 [0.145] 
     0.169 [0.462] 
 
Providing care to parents*use of formal care 
services (parents)  
   0.076 [0.328] 
     0.601 [0.691] 
 
Poor health of parents-in-law -0.040 
[0.109] 
 -0.034 
[0.110] 
 0.003 
[0.125] 
 -  -  -  
Care provision to parents-in-law 0.025 
[0.213] 
 -0.301 
[0.318] 
 -0.295 
[0.359] 
 -  -  -  
Living with parents-in-law   -0.097 [0.130] 
 -0.099 
[0.130] 
 -  -  -  
Providing care to parents*living with 
parents-in-law   
 0.587 
[0.420] 
 0.623 
[0.427] 
 -  -  -  
Use of formal care services (parents-in-law)     -0.080 [0.135] 
 -  -  -  
Providing care to parents-in-law*use of 
formal care services (parents-in-law)  
   -0.008 [0.424] 
 -  -  -  
             
Basic characteristics             
Age -0.098 
[0.027] 
*** -0.098 
[0.027] 
*** -0.094 
[0.027] 
*** -0.067 
[0.043] 
 -0.067 
[0.043] 
 -0.065 
[0.044] 
 
Age squared 0.079 
[0.026] 
*** 0.079 
[0.026] 
*** 0.075 
[0.026] 
*** 0.069 
[0.045] 
 0.066 
[0.045] 
 0.065 
[0.046] 
 
Female 0.246 
[0.082] 
*** 0.232 
[0.084] 
*** 0.236 
[0.084] 
*** 0.702 
[0.198] 
*** 0.669 
[0.197] 
*** 0.662 
[0.197] 
*** 
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 Married Sample Unmarried Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Education             
 (Secondary school)             
 High school 0.144 
[0.140] 
 0.150 
[0.139] 
 0.138 
[0.139] 
 -0.235 
[0.335] 
 -0.216 
[0.337] 
 -0.228 
[0.339] 
 
 Junior college 0.182 
[0.161] 
 0.198 
[0.161] 
 0.187 
[0.161] 
 0.036 
[0.405] 
 0.031 
[0.408] 
 0.031 
[0.408] 
 
 University or above 0.426 
[0.149] 
*** 0.438 
[0.149] 
*** 0.434 
[0.149] 
*** 0.019 
[0.369] 
 0.006 
[0.370] 
 0.012 
[0.371] 
 
Poor health -0.110 
[0.070] 
 -0.112 
[0.070] 
 -0.110 
[0.070] 
 -0.242 
[0.179] 
 -0.236 
[0.179] 
 -0.234 
[0.179] 
 
Child 0.109 
[0.138] 
 0.072 
[0.140] 
 0.073 
[0.141] 
 0.303 
[0.222] 
 0.267 
[0.228] 
 0.253 
[0.229] 
 
Household size -0.113 
[0.030] 
*** -0.093 
[0.033] 
*** -0.093 
[0.033] 
*** -0.016 
[0.066] 
 -0.008 
[0.066] 
 -0.002 
[0.066] 
 
Log of household income 0.425 
[0.071] 
*** 0.422 
[0.071] 
*** 0.424 
[0.071] 
*** 0.317 
[0.151] 
** 0.331 
[0.150] 
** 0.324 
[0.149] 
** 
Expected change in household income 0.030 
[0.008] 
*** 0.030 
[0.008] 
*** 0.031 
[0.008] 
*** 0.051 
[0.023] 
** 0.049 
[0.023] 
** 0.050 
[0.023] 
** 
Homeownership 0.156 
[0.121] 
 0.175 
[0.122] 
 0.169 
[0.122] 
 0.236 
[0.221] 
 0.256 
[0.235] 
 0.270 
[0.238] 
 
Has loans -0.231 
[0.074] 
*** -0.241 
[0.075] 
*** -0.242 
[0.075] 
*** -0.515 
[0.180] 
*** -0.519 
[0.181] 
*** -0.526 
[0.182] 
*** 
Employment             
 (Regular job)             
 Irregular job -0.003 
[0.091] 
 -0.003 
[0.091] 
 -0.003 
[0.091] 
 -0.299 
[0.219] 
 -0.265 
[0.219] 
 -0.268 
[0.220] 
 
 Not in labor force 0.053 
[0.108] 
 0.049 
[0.109] 
 0.051 
[0.109] 
 -0.408 
[0.272] 
 -0.380 
[0.276] 
 -0.411 
[0.274] 
 
 Unemployed 0.074 
[0.424] 
 0.016 
[0.420] 
 0.028 
[0.419] 
 -1.062 
[0.399] 
*** -1.099 
[0.394] 
*** -1.085 
[0.383] 
*** 
Likely unemployed -0.248 
[0.137] 
* -0.247 
[0.138] 
* -0.245 
[0.138] 
* -0.922 
[0.331] 
*** -0.890 
[0.334] 
*** -0.887 
[0.334] 
*** 
Public pensions 0.006 
[0.001] 
*** 0.006 
[0.001] 
*** 0.006 
[0.001] 
*** 0.001 
[0.003] 
 0.001 
[0.003] 
 0.001 
[0.003] 
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 Married Sample Unmarried Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Relatively poor -0.612 
[0.077] 
*** -0.613 
[0.077] 
*** -0.612 
[0.077] 
*** -0.627 
[0.186] 
*** -0.637 
[0.185] 
*** -0.647 
[0.183] 
*** 
Relatively rich 0.215 
[0.102] 
** 0.212 
[0.102] 
** 0.214 
[0.102] 
** 0.278 
[0.283] 
 0.237 
[0.284] 
 0.253 
[0.285] 
 
Altruistic 0.142 
[0.076] 
* 0.145 
[0.076] 
* 0.146 
[0.076] 
* 0.111 
[0.186] 
 0.099 
[0.185] 
 0.104 
[0.186] 
 
Low time preference 0.019 
[0.066] 
 0.017 
[0.066] 
 0.016 
[0.066] 
 -0.070 
[0.180] 
 -0.048 
[0.181] 
 -0.050 
[0.181] 
 
Risk averse 0.004 
[0.002] 
** 0.004 
[0.002] 
** 0.004 
[0.002] 
** -0.003 
[0.004] 
 -0.004 
[0.004] 
 -0.004 
[0.004] 
 
Major city 0.081 
[0.080] 
 0.078 
[0.080] 
 0.081 
[0.080] 
 0.143 
[0.186] 
 0.132 
[0.187] 
 0.124 
[0.188] 
 
Constant 6.548 
[0.763] 
*** 6.508 
[0.767] 
*** 6.419 
[0.772] 
*** 5.621 
[1.383] 
*** 5.642 
[0.1382] 
*** 5.635 
[1.375] 
*** 
             
No. of observations 2,382  2,382  2,382  463  463  463  
R2 0.14  0.14  0.15  0.28  0.29  0.29  
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regional dummies are included in all 
regressions.   
Source: Estimation based on data from the 2013 Preference Parameters Study. 
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Table 2 presents the estimation results for the married sample ((1) – (3)) and for the 
unmarried sample ((4) – (6)), respectively. Our basic models ((1) and (4)) include 
variables capturing the provision of informal parental care as well as the health status of 
parents (and parents-in-law) in addition to a set of other explanatory variables. While 
models (2) and (5) add variables indicating whether or not respondents live with their 
parents (and parents-in-law) and the interaction terms between these variables and the 
caregiving variables to the basic models, models (3) and (6) further add variables 
capturing the use of formal care services and the interaction terms between these variables 
and the caregiving variables.  
 
Contrary to expectation, the regression results (models (1) – (3)) suggest that providing 
informal care to parents or parents-in-law does not have a significant effect on married 
caregivers’ happiness regardless of caregiving conditions. On the other hand, we find the 
presence of both the caregiving and family effects in the case of unmarried caregivers. 
Note that the coefficient on the caregiving variable becomes negative and significant once 
we include a co-residence variable and its interaction term (compare the results for models 
(5) and (6)). Focusing on model (6), we find that having unhealthy parents decreases the 
happiness level of unmarried individuals by about 0.6. As far as the impact of parental 
care provision is concerned, there are some salient differences depending on whether or 
not individuals live with their parents. If unmarried individuals do not live with their 
parents but provide care to them, their happiness level is expected to decline by about 1.2. 
In contrast, if unmarried individuals live with their parents and take care of them, their 
happiness level is expected to increase by 0.34 instead. 
 
Unmarried individuals may have more trouble juggling all of their responsibilities in their 
daily life than their married counterparts, especially if they have children, and as a result, 
having to take care of their parents outside their home might be more difficult for 
unmarried caregivers than caring for them at home. This might explain why we observe 
the negative effect of parental care provision only among unmarried caregivers who do 
not live with their parents. In contrast, caring for parents who live with them may not 
cause such additional stress and the adverse impact of parental care provision might be 
offset by a sense of reward or fulfilling from taking care of ones’ parents. Finally, the use 
of formal care services does not seem to have a significant effect on happiness though the 
coefficients on this variable and its interaction term with caregiving provision were 
positive. 
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As for the rest of the regression results, as far as the married sample is concerned, we find 
a U-shaped relationship between happiness and age, as commonly found in the literature. 
Being female, having tertiary education, household income, the expected change in 
household income, and the expected amount of public pensions to be received relative to 
living costs after retirement have a positive effect on happiness. In contrast, household 
size, having loans, and perceiving a high risk of becoming unemployed within the next 
two years have a negative and significant effect on happiness. As far as the referencing 
process is concerned, feeling relatively poor decreases happiness while feeling relatively 
rich increases it. Being altruistic or risk averse also increases happiness.  
 
In the case of the unmarried sample, we find that being female, household income, and 
the expected change in household income positively affect happiness. In contrast, having 
loans, being unemployed, perceiving a high risk of becoming unemployed within the next 
two years, and feeling relatively poor are negatively correlated with happiness. We also 
find that being unemployed and fearing a high risk of becoming unemployed in the near 
future have a larger and more highly significant effect on happiness for unmarried 
individuals than for married counterparts. This seems to underscore the fact that 
unmarried individuals are more vulnerable to negative income shocks than those with 
spouses. 
 
In sum, this paper finds key differences in the impact of informal parental care on 
caregivers’ happiness between married and unmarried caregivers. While an insignificant 
effect was found for married caregivers, a negative and significant effect was found for 
unmarried counterparts, though only for those who take care of their parents outside their 
home. The greater burden of informal parental care on unmarried children than married 
children is consistent with the findings of the previous literature (e.g., Hansen, Slagsvold 
and Ingebretsen, 2013). 
 
Primary responsibility for parental care used to be borne by daughters-in-law in many 
East Asian countries, and particular attention tended to be paid to daughters-in-law by 
researchers when analyzing the impact of informal elderly care on caregivers’ life (e.g., 
Do et al., 2013; Sugawara and Nakamura, 2014). However, such traditional norms have 
been changing in Japan in recent years (e.g., Tsutsui, Muramatsu and Higashino, 2014), 
and indeed, Hanaoka and Norton (2008) find that the role of daughters-in-law in parental 
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care is becoming less important than that of unmarried children. The findings of this study 
adds another dimension to these existing studies in that a more adverse effect of informal 
parental care is found on the subjective well-being of unmarried caregivers than that of 
married caregivers. Such findings call for more attention to be paid to unmarried 
caregivers, especially if we take account of the fact that unmarried caregivers may have 
more difficulty juggling all of their responsibilities in their daily life with less support 
from family members and tend to be more vulnerable to negative income shocks than 
married caregivers. Unmarried caregivers could therefore be regarded as a potential risk 
group as they might be bearing a disproportionate burden of informal elderly care.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has made an attempt to examine the impact of informal elderly care on 
caregivers’ happiness in Japan as part of the assessment of the “cost” of informal elderly 
care as family members form the backbone of long-term care systems in many parts of 
the world including Japan. It carefully tested for the endogeneity of the caregiving 
variables in the happiness model and found that these caregiving variables could be 
treated as exogenous in the present analysis. The empirical results of this paper show that 
while no significant effect of providing parental care on married caregivers’ happiness 
was detected, an adverse and significant effect was found on unmarried caregivers’ 
happiness. However, such a negative effect was found only for unmarried caregivers who 
have to care for their parents outside their home. 
 
We have also tried to see whether the use of formal care services may alleviate the 
negative effect of elderly care provision. We did not find a significant relationship 
between the use of formal care services and happiness though the coefficient on the 
interaction terms between caregiving and formal care services usage variables was 
positive (but not statistically significant) for both the married and unmarried samples. 
Although the insignificant effect of formal care services usage found in this study might 
imply that they are not effective enough in alleviating the burden of informal elderly care, 
this could be due to the relatively small sample of those who care their parents or parents-
in-law and avail themselves of formal care services. Given that the existing literature 
suggests that formal care services help reduce the burden on caregivers (e.g., Kumamoto, 
Arai and Zarit, 2006), further research is required before reaching any conclusion on the 
effectiveness of formal care services in reducing the burden on family caregivers.  
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The current research is therefore not without limitations. First, the insignificant effect of 
parental care provision on married caregivers’ happiness might be due to the relatively 
small number of caregivers in the married sample. Further research is thus needed to 
analyze the impact of parental care provision on married caregivers’ subjective well-
being. Second, although some unique variables capturing respondents’ preference 
parameters were used to control for some of the time-invariant characteristics of 
individuals, it would have been preferable to conduct a panel data analysis that takes into 
account individual fixed effects if such data had been available. Third, as mentioned 
earlier, it would be of interest to examine the impact of informal elderly care on the well-
being of spouse caregivers as they are often the primary caregiver in the case of married 
couples. Unfortunately, data limitations did not allow the current research to examine the 
case of spouses. Finally, the data used for the empirical analysis did not collect 
information on the intensity or duration of parental care provision. Such aspects of 
caregiving are likely to influence the extent to which informal elderly care affects the 
well-being of caregivers. This is also left as one of the key agendas for future research. 
 
Despite the above limitations, this research has generated some key findings that have 
important policy implications. The fact that caring for elderly parents is found to have a 
negative effect on the subjective well-being of unmarried caregivers sheds light on the 
important role that formal care services could play in reducing the burden on caregivers, 
particularly unmarried caregivers who presumably receive less support, both emotional 
and physical support, from family members. Reducing the burden of informal elderly care 
on caregivers should be a critical agenda for the government as the increased burden on 
caregivers is likely to lead to the more costly institutionalization of care recipients 
(Kurasawa et al., 2012). Moreover, given that unmarried caregivers are more likely to 
play a greater number of roles than married caregivers, especially if they have children, 
more support to facilitate informal care should be provided, for example, through such 
initiatives as flexible working arrangements, paid and unpaid leave, and respite care.  
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Appendix I: Description of Variables 
Variables Description 
Age Age expressed in years 
Age squared Age squared divided by 100 
Female Dummy variable that equals one if respondents are female 
Education  
  Secondary school Dummy variable that equals one if respondents have completed secondary 
school education or lower 
  High school Dummy variable that equals one if respondents have completed high school 
education 
  Junior college Dummy variable that equals one if respondents have completed junior college 
education 
  University Dummy variable that equals one if respondents have obtained a university 
degree or higher 
Poor health Dummy variable that equals one if respondents are receiving treatment at a 
hospital or a clinic for a chronic disease or injury 
Child Dummy variable that equals one if respondents have a child/children 
Household size Total number of household members 
Household income Log of annual household income in thousands of yen  
Since the choices of the answers to the question on annual household income 
were in bracket form, a continuous variable was created by assigning the 
following values to each answer: 
(1) Less than 1 million yen: 800,000 yen 
(2) 1 million to less than 2 million yen: 1.5 million yen 
(3) 2 million to less than 4 million yen: 3 million yen 
(4) 4 million to less than 6 million yen: 5 million yen 
(5) 6 million to less than 8 million yen: 7 million yen 
(6) 8 million to less than 10 million yen: 9 million yen 
(7) 10 million to less than 12 million yen: 11 million yen 
(8) 12 million to less than 14 million yen: 13 million yen 
(9) 14 million to less than 16 million yen: 15 million yen 
(10) 16 million to less than 18 million yen: 17 million yen 
(11) 18 million to less than 20 million yen: 19 million yen 
(12) 20 million yen or over: 25 million yen 
Expected change in 
household income in 
that year 
Percentage change respondents expect in the current year’s household income 
in comparison with that of the previous year. 
Since the choices of the answers to the question on the expected change in 
household income were in bracket form, a continuous variable was created by 
assigning the following values to each answer: 
(1) 9% or greater decline: -11.25% 
(2) 7% or greater but less than 9% decline: -8% 
(3) 5% or greater but less than 7% decline: -6% 
(4) 3% or greater but less than 5% decline: -4% 
(5) 1% or greater but less than 3% decline: -2% 
(6) Less than 1% decline or less than 1% increase: 0% 
(7) 1% or greater but less than 3% increase: 2% 
(8) 3% or greater but less than 5% increase: 4% 
(9) 5% or greater but less than 7% increase: 6% 
(10) 7% or greater but less than 9% increase: 8% 
(11) 9% or greater increase: 11.25% 
Homeownership Dummy variable that equals one if respondents own a house or an apartment 
Has loans Dummy variable that equals one if respondents have any loans 
Employment  
  Regular job Dummy variable that equals one if respondents have a regular job (i.e., 
working as a full-time employee) 
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Variables Description 
Irregular job Dummy variable equals one if respondents have an irregular job (i.e., working 
as a part-time worker, temporary worker, fixed-term worker, or dispatched 
worker from a temporary agency) 
Unemployed Dummy variable that equals one if respondents are unemployed 
Not in labor force Dummy variable that equals one if respondents are not in the labor force (i.e., 
housewives/husbands, students or retired) 
Likely unemployed Dummy variable that equals one if respondents are currently employed but 
perceive a high risk of becoming unemployed in the next two years 
Public pensions Percentage of living expenses expected to be covered by public pensions after 
retirement (or actual percentage if respondents are already retired) 
Since the choices of the answers to the question about what percentage of their 
living costs respondents expect public pensions to cover after retirement were 
in bracket form, a continuous variable was created by assigning the following 
values to each answer: 
(1) Between 0 and 9%: 5% 
(2) Between 10 and 19%: 15% 
(3) Between 20 and 29%: 25% 
(4) Between 30 and 39%: 35% 
(5) Between 40 and 49%: 45% 
(6) Between 50 and 59%: 55% 
(7) Between 60 and 60%: 65% 
(8) Between 70 and 79%: 75% 
(9) Between 80 and 80%: 85% 
(10) 90% or over: 95% 
Altruistic Dummy variable that equals one if respondents have donated any money in 
the previous year 
Risk averse Chance of rain (%) that will make respondents bring an umbrella with them 
when they go out 
Low time preference Dummy variable that equals one if respondents used to get homework done 
right away or fairly early during school vacations when they were a child 
Relatively poor Dummy variable that equals one if respondents think that the living standard 
of others is much higher or somewhat higher than their own 
Relatively rich Dummy variable that equals one if respondents think that the living standard 
of others is much lower or somewhat lower than their own 
Care provision to 
parents 
Dummy variable that equals one if respondents care for their parent(s) 
Care provision to 
parents-in-law 
Dummy variable that equals one if respondents care for their parent(s)-in-law 
Poor health of parents Dummy variable that equals one if respondents’ father or mother is certified as 
Support Level 1-2 or Care Level 1-5 under the long-term insurance system 
Poor health of 
parents-in-law 
Dummy variable that equals one if respondents’ father-in-law or mother-in-
law is certified as one of the Support Levels 1-2 or Care Levels 1-5 under the 
long-term insurance system 
Living with parents Dummy variable that equals one if respondents live with their parent(s) 
Living with parents-
in-law 
Dummy variable that equals one if respondents live with their parent(s)-in-law 
Use of formal 
services (parents) 
Dummy variable that equals one if respondents’ parents avail themselves of 
formal care services (home helpers or institutions) 
Use of formal 
services (parents-in-
law) 
Dummy variable that equals one if respondents’ parents-in-law avail 
themselves of formal care services (home helpers or institutions) 
Number of sisters Number of sisters 
Number of brothers Number of brothers 
Number of sisters-in- Number of respondents’ spouse’s sisters 
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Variables Description 
law 
Number of brothers-
in-law 
Number of respondents’ spouse’s brothers 
Strong filial 
obligation 
Dummy variable that equals one if respondents strongly agree with the 
statement that children should take care of their parents when they require 
long-term care 
Regions  
  Hokkaido Dummy variable that equals one if respondents reside in Hokkaido 
  Tohoku Dummy variable that equals one if respondents reside in Tohoku 
  Kanto Dummy variable that equals one if respondents reside in Kanto 
  Koshinetsu Dummy variable that equals one if respondents reside in Koshinetsu 
  Hokuriku Dummy variable that equals one if respondents reside in Hokuriku 
  Tokai Dummy variable that equals one if respondents reside in Tokai 
  Kinki Dummy variable that equals one if respondents reside in Kinki 
  Chugoku Dummy variable that equals one if respondents reside in Chugoku 
  Shikoku Dummy variable that equals one if respondents reside in Shikoku 
  Kyushu Dummy variable that equals one if respondents reside in Kyushu 
Major city Dummy variable that equals one if respondents reside in a major (ordinance-
designated) city 
Note: Given that the questions on respondents’ educational attainment as well as the number of siblings and 
siblings-in-law were not included in the 2013 survey, we obtained the relevant information from the 2011 
survey data using respondents’ unique ID numbers.  
 
  
36 
 
Appendix II: Regression Results for Ordered Logit Models 
 Married Sample Unmarried Sample 
Caregiving and family effects     
Poor health of parents -0.073 
[0.127] 
 -0.881 
[0.387] 
** 
Care provision to parents 0.164 
[0.336] 
 -1.158 
[0.516] 
** 
Living with parents -0.226 
[0.143] 
 -0.269 
[0.243] 
 
Providing care to parents*living with 
parents 
-0.519 
[0.357] 
 1.610 
[0.557] 
*** 
Use of formal care services (parents) -0.252 
[0.169] 
 0.430 
[0.539] 
 
Providing care to parents*use of formal 
care services (parents) 
0.188 
[0.384] 
 0.798 
[0.732] 
 
Poor health of parents-in-law -0.010 
[0.145] 
 -  
Care provision to parents-in-law -0.291 
[0.439] 
 -  
Living with parents-in-law -0.057 
[0.149] 
 -  
Providing care to parents*living with 
parents-in-law  
0.869 
[0.478] 
* -  
Use of formal care services (parents-in-
law) 
-0.043 
[0.159] 
 -  
Providing care to parents-in-law*use of 
formal care services (parents-in-law) 
-0.306 
[0.467] 
 -  
     
Basic characteristics     
Age -0.111 
[0.031] 
*** -0.079 
[0.048] 
 
Age squared 0.087 
[0.030] 
*** 0.080 
[0.051] 
 
Female 0.276 
[0.099] 
*** 0.734 
[0.217] 
*** 
Education     
 (Secondary school)     
 High school 0.219 
[0.159] 
 -0.139 
[0.405] 
 
 Junior college 0.280 
[0.183] 
 0.250 
[0.487] 
 
 University or above 0.534 
[0.171] 
*** 0.175 
[0.435] 
 
Poor health -0.110 
[0.081] 
 -0.183 
[0.189] 
 
Child 0.104 
[0.169] 
 0.242 
[0.252] 
 
Household size -0.115 
[0.039] 
*** -0.015 
[0.075] 
 
Log of household income 0.523 
[0.083] 
*** 0.321 
[0.171] 
* 
Expected change in household income 0.035 
[0.009] 
*** 0.062 
[0.026] 
** 
Homeownership 0.200 
[0.142] 
 0.309 
[0.258] 
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 Married Sample Unmarried Sample 
Has loans -0.318 
[0.087] 
*** -0.643 
[0.203] 
*** 
Employment     
 (Regular job)     
 Irregular job 0.010 
[0.104] 
 -0.242 
[0.235] 
 
 Not in labor force 0.094 
[0.128] 
 -0.413 
[0.296] 
 
 Unemployed 0.134 
[0.425] 
 -1.088 
[0.418] 
*** 
Likely unemployed -0.288 
[0.152] 
* -1.009 
[0.361] 
*** 
Public pensions 0.006 
[0.002] 
*** 4.72E-05 
[0.004] 
 
Relatively poor -0.653 
[0.087] 
*** -0.685 
[0.204] 
*** 
Relatively rich 0.362 
[0.120] 
*** 0.310 
[0.332] 
 
Altruistic 0.151 
[0.086] 
* 0.215 
[0.205] 
 
Low time preference -0.006 
[0.076] 
 -0.080 
[0.189] 
 
Risk averse 0.005 
[0.002] 
** -0.003 
[0.004] 
 
Major city 0.087 
[0.090] 
 0.144 
[0.199] 
 
     
No. of observations 2,382 463 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.08 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. Regional dummies are included in all regressions.   
Source: Estimation based on data from the 2013 Preference Parameters Study. 
 
 
